States of Secrecy: An Introduction by Vermeir, Koen & Margócsy, Daniel
States of Secrecy
Koen Vermeir, Daniel Margo´csy
To cite this version:
Koen Vermeir, Daniel Margo´csy. States of Secrecy: An Introduction. British Journal for the




Submitted on 3 Jul 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
STATES OF SECRECY: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Koen Vermeir and Dániel Margócsy 
 
to appear in the British Journal for the History of  Science 
 
‘There’s not a city in the world without its Loyal and Ancient and Justified and Hermetic 
Order of  little men who think they can reap the secrets of  the ancients for a couple of  
hours every Thursday night and don’t realize what prats they look in a robe.’1 
 
 
A Science without Secrets2 
 
The study of  scientific secrecy began with the statement that it did not exist. In 1942, Robert 
Merton published a short note in the anti-fascist Journal of  Legal and Political Sociology, in which he laid down 
his famous four norms of  the scientific ethos: communism, universalism, disinterestedness and organized 
scepticism.3 Writing in a politically charged moment, Merton claimed that, like democracy, science was by 
definition ‘communal.’ Scientific discoveries were communicated freely, and ‘secrecy was an antithesis of  
this norm.’ As Merton approvingly quoted J.D. Bernal, ‘the growth of  modern science coincided with a 
definite rejection of  the ideal of  secrecy.’4 This idea was also reinforced by the founding myths of  science 
or of  the Scientific Revolution, in which the ancient Greeks, or alternatively Francis Bacon and the Royal 
Society, figured as the heralds of  openness.5 
Merton expressed a sentiment shared by many scientists and policy-makers of  the age. While 
military secrecy might have been necessary for developing the bomb and winning World War II, scientific 
research was supposed to become open again with the advent of  peace. In 1945 Vannevar Bush, head of  
                                                 
1 Terry Pratchett, Going Postal, New York: HarperCollins, 2004, p. 128.  
2 This special issue is based on the States of  Secrecy conference at Harvard University, April 8, 2009. The editors would like to 
acknowledge the support of  the Harvard Kennedy School’s Science and Technology Program, Harvard’s History of  Science 
Department and its various working groups, and CLAW of  the Institute of  Philosophy, Leuven University. We are thankful 
to participants, commentators and the audience at this conference, especially to Kristie Macrakis, Daniel Juette, Marco 
Viniegra, Sheila Jasanoff, Michael Herzfeld, Katharine Park and Alisha Rankin. The authors of  this introduction would also 
like to thank Ken Alder, Liliane Hilaire-Pérez and Adrian Johns.  
3 David Hollinger, ‘The Defense of  Democracy and Robert K. Merton’s Formulation of  the Scientific Ethos’, Knowledge and 
Society (1983) 4, pp. 1-15.  
4 Robert Merton, ‘Science and Technology in a Democratic Order’, Journal of  Legal and Political Sociology (1942) 1, pp. 115-126. 
The quote is from J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of  Science, New York: Macmillan, 1939, pp. 150-151.  
5 William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of  Nature: Books of  Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994, ch. 10. Ernan McMullin, ‘Openness and secrecy in science: some notes on early history’, Science, 
Technology and Human Values (1985) 10, pp. 14–23. 
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the Office of  Scientific Research of  Development, famously argued for publishing previously classified, 
military information, and, as Alex Wellerstein shows in this issue, these feelings were shared by many 
science policy-makers, if  only for a few years.6 At the level of  policy-making, the American enthusiasm for 
openness was soon supplanted by the security concerns of  the McCarthy era. Yet, among sociologists, the 
views of  Merton remained highly influential.7 Edward Shils emphasized the necessary openness of  science 
in 1956 to argue against McCarthyist obsessions with government secrecy. Knowledge had to be exchanged 
openly. ‘Without it science could not exist.’8 
By 1982, Sissela Bok pointed out the difference between the ritualistic denunciation of  secrecy and 
the actual role of  commercial and state secrets in scientific practice. Despite some qualifications about the 
practical need for secrecy, she concluded with a call for responsibility by the scientists, lest new practices of  
secrecy ‘gain such a strong foothold that they affect the momentum, the quality, and the direction of  
scientific research in ways difficult to reverse.’9 But already for Merton too, ‘the commercialism of  wider 
society’ had a more pernicious effect on science than issues of  national security. As he wrote, ‘the 
communism of  the scientific ethos [was] abstractly incompatible with the definition of  technology as 
‘private property’ in a capitalistic economy.’ Guided by this norm, scientific inventors patented ‘their work 
to ensure its being made available for public use,’ and not to limit the circulation of  knowledge. Across the 
Atlantic, Michael Polányi echoed these sentiments in his proposal for patent reform in 1944. A staunch 
opponent of  a planned economy of  science, Polányi considered the threat of  commercial secrecy dire 
enough to warrant government intervention. The contemporary patent system needed to be replaced by 
government licensing to support the free circulation of  knowledge.10  
For long, the history of  science has not paid detailed attention to the implications of  Mertonian 
norms or Bernal’s claims, and simply reiterated that modern science is essentially open, while technology is 
secretive.11 As economic historians have argued, this openness might have been the result of  the 
institutional framework of  early modern Europe. Paul David suggested that modern science was born out 
                                                 
6 Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier : A Report to the President, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1945. See 
also Michael Aaron Dennis, ‘Reconstructing Sociotechnical Order: Vannevar Bush and US Science Policy’, in Sheila Jasanoff  
(ed.), States of  Knowledge: The Co-Production of  Science and Social Order, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 225-253.  
7 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of  a Late Modern Vocation, Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2008, pp. 
113-115.  
8 Edward Shils, The Torment of  Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of  American Security Policies, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956, 
p. 176. 
9 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of  Concealment and Revelation, New York: Vintage, 1989, p. 170. For an updated but similar 
view, see David Resnik, ‘Openness versus Secrecy in Scientific Research’, Episteme (2006) 2, pp. 135-147. 
10 Michael Polányi, ‘Patent Reform’, The Review of  Economic Studies (1944) 11, pp. 61-76; Adrian Johns, ‘Intellectual Property and 
the Nature of  Science’, Cultural Studies (2006) 20, pp. 145-164. 
11 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographic Inquiry, Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 200-204; 
Derek de Solla Price, Science since Babylon, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961, pp. 117-35; McMullin, op.cit.; David Hull, 
‘Openness and Secrecy in Science: Their Origins and Limitationsm’, Science, Technology & Human Values (1985) 10, pp. 4-13. 
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of  the system of  courtly patronage, which rewarded scientists for open publication.12 And, as Joel Mokyr 
has claimed, the Enlightenment’s growing openness and lower access costs to scientific knowledge led to 
the Industrial Revolution.13 While these current narratives do not neglect the advantages that secrecy might 
have for individual scientists, they claim that the modern infrastructure of  science is distinct by developing 
powerful incentives for the practice of  openness, a public good.14  
 
Secrets for Profit or Security 
 
Secrecy became a major research topic in the history of  science only in the last twenty-five years. 
Historians have come to realize how suffused scientific practice is with issues of  secrecy. Yet they too often 
consider secrecy simply as a manner of  protecting intellectual property to gain economic or military 
advantage over competitors.15 Rational individuals restrict physical and informational access to their 
knowledge only because they value their property, and governments establish regimes of  secrecy only to 
ensure their military primacy in competition with other states.16 Writings in this genre share their 
interpretive framework with Merton, except that the relative importance of  private interests and social 
norms is inverted.17 Some argue that trade secrets and patents help scientists reap financial rewards for 
their scientific discoveries, and is therefore beneficial for the development of  science. Others show that 
openness is not necessarily a social norm: it can be a rational, individualistic strategy again to maximize 
private benefits. As a result, the opposition between secretive technology and open science has been 
qualified, nuanced and contextualized. 
As an individual strategy, secrets have received most attention in the context of  the early modern 
scientific revolution. As historians have come to argue for the role of  artisans in the development of  
modern science, they began to explore how craft secrets and trade secrets played a role in early modern 
                                                 
12 Paul David, ‘The Historical Origins of  ‘Open Science’: An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency 
Contracting in the Scientific Revolution’, Capitalism and Society (2008) 3.  
13 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of  Athena: Historical Origins of  the Knowledge Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.  
14 For the Netherlands, see Karel Davids, ‘Openness or Secrecy? Industrial Espionage in the Dutch Republic’, The Journal of  
European Economic History (1995) 24, pp. 333-348. 
15 See e.g. the bibliography up to 1985, that apart from general background literature is divided in two sections 
‘University/Industry relations’ and ‘National Security’: ‘Selected Bibliography on Openness and Secrecy in Science and 
Technology’, Science, Technology, & Human Values (1985) 10, pp. 110-114. 
16
  On the spatial aspects of  secrecy, see Owen Hannaway, ‘Laboratory Design and the Aim of  Science: Andreas Libavius versus 
Tycho Brahe’, Isis (1986) 77, pp. 584-610; Jole Shackelford, ‘Tycho Brahe, Laboratory Design and the Aim of  Science: 
Reading Plans in Context’, Isis (1993) 84, pp. 211-230; William R. Newman, ‘Alchemical Symbolism and Concealment: The 
Chemical house of  Libavius’, in Peter Galison and Emily Thompson (eds.), The Architecture of  Science, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999, pp. 59-77.  See also Myles W. Jackson, Spectrum of  Belief: Joseph von Fraunhofer and the Craft of  Presicion Optics, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2000, ch. 3. 
17 For an early example of  such an inversion, see Ian I. Mitroff, ‘Norms and Counter-Norms in a Select Group of  the Apollo 
Moon Scientists: A Case Study of  the Ambivalence of  Scientists’, American Sociological Review (1974) 39, pp. 579-595, esp. pp. 
592-3. 
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practices of  knowledge production. Pamela Long famously argued that craft secrets as a category 
developed only in the late Middle Ages, when guilds in the urbanized centers of  Europe first formed a 
concept of  knowledge as intellectual property, and claimed monopoly ownership of  it. The picture Long 
paints is subtle and complex, making distinctions between the rhetoric of  openness and actual openness, 
pointing at differences between individual writers or traditions, and placing them in their practical, 
intellectual and political context.18 Writing in a similar vein, Larry Epstein suggested that the invention of  
craft secrets did not necessarily hamper the development of  scientific and artisanal knowledges. Partly 
proto-intellectual property and partly a form of  tacit knowledge, craft secrets provided an incentive for 
innovation in a world without the modern patent system, and were also disseminated through 
apprenticeship within existing guild structures, thereby ensuring that knowledge did not become lost after 
the inventor’s death.19 From the start, however, there also existed incentives for openness, although the 
early modern patent system was not one of  these: as Mario Biagioli argued, patent disclosure became 
standard practice only after the American and French revolutions.20 The world of  patronage might have 
acted as a stronger incentive, as artisans frequently touted their skills and knowledges in printed 
publications to attract potential patrons.21 Similarly, as science became commercialized during the early 
modern consumer revolution, the circulation of  advertisements and users’ guides might have contributed 
to the larger public’s awareness of  the importance of  technoscientific knowhow.22 Increasing 
communication and the overlap between artisan and learned cultures also played a role.23 By the 
eighteenth-century, France and other countries in continental Europe offered prizes and organized 
competitions for artisans who were willing to part with their secrets.24  
The Enlightenment culture of  openness (Öffentlichkeit), so eloquently described by Jürgen 
                                                 
18 Pamela Long, Openness, Secrecy, Authorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of  Knowledge from Antiquity to the Renaissance, Baltimore; 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. In a special issue edited by Karel Davids, a number of  scholars have elaborated on the 
tradition of  craft secrets. See Karel Davids (ed.), Early Science and Medicine (2005) 10, and especially Karel Davids, ‘Craft 
Secrecy in Europe in the Early Modern Period: A Comparative View’, Early Science and Medicine (2005) 10, pp. 341-348. 
19 Stephan Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds. Apprenticeship and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe’, The Journal of  Economic 
History (1998) 29, pp. 684-713.; Stephan Epstein and Maarten Prak, ‘Introduction: Guilds, Innovation, and the European 
Economy, 1400-1800’, in Stephan Epstein and Maarten Prak, eds. Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400-1800, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 1-24. 
20 Liliane Hilaire-Pérez and Catherine Verna, ‘Dissemination of  Technical Knowledge in the Middle Ages and the Early 
Modern Era: New Approaches and Methodological Issues’, Technology and Culture (2006) 47, pp. 536-565; Mario Biagioli, 
‘Patent Republic: Specifying Inventions, Constructing Authors and Rights’, Social Research (2003) 7, pp. 1129-1172.  
21 Long, op. cit., ch. 4; Marcus Popplow, ‘Why Draw Pictures of  Machines? The Social Contexts of  Early Modern Machine 
Drawings’, in Wolfgang Lefèvre, ed. Picturing Machines 1400-1700, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, pp. 17-48; Paul David, op. cit. 
22
  Daniel Margócsy, ‘Advertising Cadavers in the Republic of  Letters: Anatomical Publications in Early Modern Netherlands’, 
British Journal for the History of  Science (2009) 42, pp. 187-210; Liliane Hilaire-Pérez and Marie Thébaud-Sorger, ‘Les techniques 
dans l’espace public. Publicité des inventions et littérature d’usage au XVIIIe siècle (France, Angleterre)’, Revue de Synthèse 
(2006) 127, pp. 393-428. 
23 Long, op. cit., ch 6-7. 
24 Liliane Hilaire-Pérez, L’invention technique au siècle des Lumières, Paris: Albin Michel, 2000.   
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Habermas, might well have been another incentive for scientific practitioners to abandon secrecy.25 Yet 
Enlightenment openness is usually interpreted in contrast to elite culture and the private sphere rather than 
to secrecy. The interpretation and translation of  Öffentlichkeit as the public sphere, a space of  free exchange 
and critical discussion, has guided recent work in the history of  science, which has studied the rise of  
provincial academies and scientific salons, of  professional and amateur journals, of  scientific shows and 
demonstration lectures, of  scientific discussions in coffee-houses, clubs, or newspapers, as well as other 
modes of  openness and popularization.26 In this Enlightenment rhetoric, even technological inventions 
had to be made available to all. The publication of  technological secrets took an important place in the 
French Encyclopédie. Diderot wrote and believed that ‘discoveries are only valuable and secure when they 
circulate among the general mass of  people. I am impatient to take them there.’27 Yet the historiography of  
the Enlightenment has not fully addressed how to distinguish between the related philosophical and 
sociological concepts of  the private, the elite and the secretive; and the judgment is still out whether 
Enlightenment openness was a progressive step of  modernity, or rather the reconfiguration of  traditional 
cultural and societal boundaries with new forms of  privacy and secrecy arising.28 Except for the 
groundbreaking work of  Liliane Hilaire-Pérez, the practices of  scientific secrecy are relatively understudied 
for this period.29 
According to Habermas, the public sphere disappeared with the development of  a mass consumer 
culture and the welfare state. The historiography of  secrecy in recent science reflects these concurrent 
developments. Commercialization and increasing competition are often invoked as one explanation for 
increased secrecy today. A survey has shown that, while in 1966 50% of  scientists felt safe about discussing 
their ongoing work with others, the percentage dropped to 26% by 1998, heralding a new era of  
                                                 
25 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied: 
Luchterhand, 1962; translated as The Structural Transformation of  the Public Sphere, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. 
26 For a first assessment, see Thomas Broman, ‘The Habermasian Public Sphere and ‘Science in the Enlightenment,’ History of  
Science (1998) 36: 123-149. For an update, Mary Terrall, ‘Public Science in the Enlightenment’, Modern Intellectual History (2005) 
2, pp. 265-276; and Larry Stewart, ‘Feedback Loop: A Review Essay on the Public Sphere, Pop Culture and the Early-
Modern Sciences’, Canadian Journal of  History (2007) 42, pp. 463-483; Larry Stewart and John Gascoigne, The Rise of  Public 
Science: Rhetoric, Technology, and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain, 1660-1750, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992; Jan Golinski, Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-1820, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992; Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Christine Blondel (eds.), Science and Spectacle in the European Enlightenment, 
London: Ashgate, 2008; Anne Secord, ‘Science in the Pub: Artisan Botanists in Early Nineteenth century Lancashire’, History 
of  Science (1994) 32, pp. 269-315; Daniel Roche, Le siècle des Lumières en province: académies et académiciens provinciaux, 1680-1789, 
Paris: Mouton, 1978; Stéphane Van Damme, ‘La sociabilité intellectuelle. Les usages historiographiques d’une notion’, 
Hypothèses (1997), pp. 121-132; Oliver Hochadel, Öffentliche Wissenschaft. Elektrizität in der deutschen Aufklärung, Göttingen: 
Wallstein Verlag, 2003. For a revisionist account, see Jacob Soll, The Information Master : Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State 
Intelligence System, Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 2009.   
27 Diderot cited in J. H. Mason, The Irresistible Diderot, London: Quartet Books, 1982, p. 5. See also Liliane Hilaire-Pérez, 
‘Diderot’s views on artists’ and inventors’ rights: invention, imitation and reputation,’ The British Journal for the History of  Science 
(2002) 35, pp. 129-150. 
28 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of  Enlightenment, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002 (1944); Michel 
Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Paris: Gallimard, 1975. 
29 Hilaire-Pérez, op. cit.  
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entrepreneurial science.30 As Stephen Hilgartner recounts in this issue, scientists operating in the culture of  
venture capital develop elaborate rituals to communicate results only partially, shirking from the open 
discussion of  unpublished data at scientific conferences lest competing research teams poach their ideas. 
At the extreme, some companies might even actively suppress publicly available scientific information 
relating to their products, and deliberately create doubt and ignorance where consensus had existed 
before.31 Secrecy is especially prevalent in the world of  modern biotechnology, a discipline at the 
crossroads of  science, technology and the market.32 In the crop industry, for instance, purchasing a 
genetically modified seed only entitles the owner to plant it, but not to subject it to scientific research.33 
Scientific journals now consider trade secrets and strict confidentiality agreements with employees a 
standard for modern biotech companies, and offer policy recommendations on how to inculcate the norm 
of  secrecy in openness-oriented academic scientists.34 Yet, as the debates around gene patenting have 
shown, although commercial considerations and the quest for scientific credit often clash, full secrecy 
hardly ever emerges.35 As Mario Biagioli argues in this issue, scientists at the boundaries of  academia and 
industry do not necessarily seek complete secrecy, but rather the establishment of  the proper temporal 
order of  making knowledge public.  
Yet, pace Habermas, commercial secrecy is not a new development of  consumer society. As 
historians have shown, the Spanish empire used secrecy as a tool to maintain its monopoly in transatlantic 
trade already in the sixteenth century; and all colonial empires routinely controlled the movement of  skilled 
practitioners and the flow of  information related to maps, trade routes and economic botany.36 As Vera 
Keller’s article argues in this issue, the secrets of  nature were also arcana imperii. What is new for the 
globalized world of  the 20th and 21st centuries is the shift of  large-scale commercial secrecy from 
mercantilist states to multinational companies. In this world, the state maintains an interest in 
                                                 
30 John Walsh and Wei Hong, ‘Secrecy Is Increasing in Step with Competition’, Nature (2003) 422, pp. 801-802.  
31 Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of  Ignorance, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008.  
32 Susan Wright and David Wallace, ‘Varieties of  Secrets and Secret Varieties: The Case of  Biotechnology’, Politics and the Life 
Sciences (2000) 19, pp. 33-45.  
33 Emily Waltz, ‘Under Wraps’, Nature Biotechnology (2009) 27, pp. 880-882. 
34 Sharon Mollman Elliott, ‘The Threat from Within: Trade Secret Theft by Employees’, Nature Biotechnology (2007) 25, pp. 293-
295; Kerry Medd and Antoinette Konski, ‘Workplace Programs to Protect Trade Secrets’, Nature Biotechnology (2003) 21, pp. 
201-203.  
35 T. Caulfield et al., ‘Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of  Human Gene Patenting Controversies’, Nature Biotechnology  
(2006) 24, pp. 1091-1094; see also Stephen Hilgartner, ‘The Human Genome Project’, in Sheila Jasanoff  et al. (eds.), 
Handbook of  Science and Technology Studies, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995, pp. 302-315.  
36 María M. Portuondo, Secret Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World, Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2009; Kees 
Zandvliet, Mapping for Money: Maps, Plans and Topographic Paintings and Their Role in Dutch Overseas Expansion During the 16th and 
17th Centuries, Amsterdam: Batavian Lion, 1998; Londa Schiebinger and Claudia Swan (eds.), Colonial Botany: Science, Commerce 
and Politics in the Early Modern World, Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2005; Reinhold Reith. ‘Know-how, 
Technologietransfer und die Arcana artis im Mitteleuropa der frühen Neuzeit’, Early Science and Medicine (2005) 10, pp. 349-
377; John Harris, Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000.  
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technoscientific secrecy primarily as it relates to the military and issues of  national security.37 For the 
historiography, the epitome of  this interest is World War II nuclear research. As the Allied Forces came to 
realize the potential of  nuclear fission in 1940, the British and American physicist community voluntarily 
stopped publishing their results in scientific journals.38 And with the establishment of  the Manhattan 
Project, secrecy was no longer exclusively oriented towards the outside. Most scientific contributors to the 
bomb worked in isolation from each other, as Lieutenant General Leslie Groves compartmentalized 
nuclear research, and forbade the open discussion of  findings between the different research groups of  the 
Los Alamos community, as well.39  
The secrecy of  nuclear science did not disappear after the dropping of  the bomb. During the cold 
war, a whole culture of  secret science emerged in America, with its own, alternative system of  authorship, 
peer review and classified journals.40 The big science of  physics was studied in the two separate spheres of  
the academia and the military, at times leading to discovering the same results twice. And the situation 
barely improved with the fall of  the Berlin wall. After the promise of  declassification in the mid-1990s, 
government secrecy has gained new powers in the years since 9/11. Within the United States, the 
government spent almost nine billion dollars on security classification in 2009, a sum that has doubled 
since 1995.41 Many of  these investments actually fund commercial enterprises, as the U.S. government has 
been outsourcing much of  its intelligence operations to private companies.42 While the defenders of  these 
policies claim that the culture of  secrecy is only for the protection of  sensitive information and vulnerable 
populations, opponents are eager to point out the dangers of  the existence of  a classified universe on par 
with the public world.43 According to these critics, the contemporary culture of  secrecy is not only about 
the protection of  intellectual property, for commercial or military reasons, but it has a self-sustaining 
power on its own. It creates hierarchies of  inclusion and exclusion, and leads to a government that is only 
responsible to itself. From the understanding of  secrets as protected intellectual property, we have arrived 
in the world of  secrecy.  
 
                                                 
37
  For a recent overview, see Limiting Knowledge in a Democracy, a special issue of  Social Research (2010)77. 
38 Michael Aaron Dennis, ‘Secrecy and Science Revisited: From Politics to Historical Practice and Back’, in Judith Reppy (ed.) 
Secrecy and Knowledge Production, Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #23, 1999; Michael Gordin. Red 
Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of  the Atomic Monopoly, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009, p. 30. For a 
bibliography of  the bomb and secrecy, see the article in this issue by Alex Wellerstein.   
39 Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan project’s Indispensable Man, South Royalton: Steerforth 
Press, 2002, chs. 12-13.  
40 Hugh Gusterson, People of  the Bomb: Portraits of  America’s Nuclear Complex, Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2000.  
41 Information Security Oversight Office, 2009 Cost Report, Washington, DC, 2010.  
42
  Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of  Intelligence Outsourcing, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.  
43 Peter Galison, ‘Removing Knowledge’, Critical Inquiry (2004) 31, pp. 195-223; Steven Aftergood, ‘Government Secrecy and 
Knowledge Production’, in Judith Reppy, op. cit.; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998; Peter Galison and Rob Moss, Secrecy, Film Premiere: The Sundance Film Festival (2008). 
States of  Secrecy   8 
From Secrets to Secrecy 
 
The prevalence of  craft secrecy, intellectual property and state secrets in the historiography of  
science betrays a focus on the content of  the secret, i.e. on the invention, method or recipe that people 
wanted to keep hidden for security reasons or for making a profit. With this special issue, we want to give a 
state of  research on scientific secrecy, but we also want also to hint at the richness of  historiographical 
work still to be done when the focus is shifted from secrets to secrecy as a dynamic social relation. In many 
instances, what is kept secret is not even relevant for studying the dynamics of  secrecy, i.e. the practices of  
simulation and dissimulation, the rhetoric of  secretiveness or the strategies of  hiding and revealing that are 
employed. 
The work of  the German sociologist Georg Simmel is a rich source of  inspiration for studying the 
dynamics of  secrecy. For him, secrecy, ‘one of  the greatest accomplishments of  humanity,’ was a necessary 
element of  human society.44 Just as the circulation and exchange of  gifts, the non-circulation and 
withholding of  knowledge was a structuring force of  society and social hierarchy. While Simmel’s work had 
a large influence in anthropology and religious studies, it has had virtually no impact on the historiography 
of  science. This is unfortunate, because understanding the socio-psychology and sociology of  secrecy are 
crucial for the study of  the practices of  secrecy in the history of  science, as Koen Vermeir argues in this 
issue. At least, such a study will help us to overcome too simplistic, monolithic and reductionist definitions 
of  secrecy and openness. 
Secrets evoke excitement and desire. Those who have a secret are under constant tension: they want 
to keep the secret, but they also want to indicate that they have a secret, to veil and unveil it at the same 
time. Those who have a secret are teased and tempted into betraying the secret, and reach release and 
climax only when the secret is shared with others.45 At the same time, those who know about the secret but 
do not have it, desire it. They project their hopes and fears on it, and these passions are heightened by the 
unknown character of  the secret. In these scenarios, owners do not use secrets as a tool of  monopoly, but 
rather to establish a special bond with those to whom they reveal their knowledge.46 Such a desire to share 
could also lead to open publication: one example is that after the invention of  the printing press, books of  
secrets were among the most popular and most widely published.47 This seems incomprehensible when 
                                                 
44 Georg Simmel, ‘The Sociology of  Secrecy and of  Secret Societies’, The American Journal of  Sociology (1906) 11, pp. 441-498, 
especially p. 462. 
45 Simmel also describes the ‘joy of  confession’, for instance, ‘which may contain that sense of  power in negative and perverted 
form, as self-abasement and contrition.’ Simmel, op.cit., p. 466. 
46 See, for instance, Giorgio Vasari’s account of  Jan van Eyck’s sharing of  his secret of  oil painting. Marc Gotlieb, ‘The 
Painter’s Secret: Invention and Rivalry from Vasari to Balzac’, Art Bulletin (2002) 84, pp. 469-490; Michael Herzfeld, op. cit., 
ch. 4.  
47 For these books of  secrets, see Eamon, op. cit., who is more sensitive than most to the dynamics of  secrecy but does not 
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historians stay focused on the knowledge content of  the secret instead of  on the psychodynamics of  
secrecy. 
As objects of  desire, secrets accrue a special value, even if  their content would in itself  be valueless. 
They hide the real value of  the content by keeping it hidden. Blacked out spaces in texts, empty spaces on 
maps or even neurotic symptoms indicate that something has been intentionally hidden, and sparks 
speculation about its extraordinary value or meaning.48 Secrecy can thus be used to support beliefs that are 
mediocre, irrational, unverifiable and nonsensical, in science as well as in esoteric practices.49 Therefore, 
alchemists or professors of  secrets were often disappointed when they exchanged secrets and assessed the 
real value of  what they received in return. Yet, in other cases, the mark of  secrecy serves as a correct 
indicator of  the object’s importance. In 1941, for instance, the Russian scientists Georgii Flerov inferred 
that an atomic bomb might be possible to build by noticing the suddenly secretive behaviour of  American 
researchers about nuclear physics, and wrote that ‘a stamp of  silence has been laid on this question, and 
this is the best sign of  what kind of  burning work is going on right now.’50 A proper assessment of  a 
secret’s value is especially complicated when the classified information is publicly available elsewhere.51 As 
recent events have shown, government censorship and secrecy are often about maintaining the illusion of  
information control even when everyone is able to download classified documents from a website. The 
concept of  censorship can also be used to undo the dichotomy of  private and public, and the inner and the 
outer, as Peter Galison makes clear in this issue. Drawing on contemporary practices of  censorship, Freud 
could even interpret forgetting as secrecy, as the intentional concealment by an hidden internal censor. 
Secrecy is essential to our internal lives, we cannot even trust ourselves. 52 
Objects of  desire and bearers of  value, secrets are a social phenomenon. Indeed, as Stephen 
Hilgartner points out in this issue, secrecy is often a performance aimed at an audience. For example, when 
Greek shepherds shared their secret stories of  animal theft with anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, they 
acted as if  they were approaching him surreptitiously, but in fact also ensured that their fellow shepherds 
noticed and appreciated this secretive behavior.53 In a similar vein, sociologists argue that secrecy can make 
as well as break a social group. According to Simmel, a child gets a sense of  an ‘I’ when it becomes aware 
                                                                                                                                                                       
spend much explicit reflection on it. 
48 J. B. Harley, ‘Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of  Cartography in Early Modern Europe’, Imago mundi (1988) 40, pp. 
57-76. 
49 Shils, op. cit.; Bok, op. cit., p. 155; Tanya Luhrman, ‘The magic of  secrecy’, Ethos (1989) 17, pp. 131-165.  
50 Cited by Michael Gordin, op. cit., p. 31.  
51 Shils, op. cit., p. 221, argued that much of  the ‘secret’ information of  the government was in fact openly available and was 
often not worth keeping. It did not justify the ‘tremendous disturbance and degradation that America has suffered from its 
own zealots of  secrecy’. 
52
  For a similar perspective, see Miklós Haraszti, The Velvet Prison: Artists under State Socialism, New York: Basic Books, 1987.  
53 Michael Herzfeld, The Body Impolitic: Artisans and Artifice in the Global Hierarchy of  Value, Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
2004, pp. 108-109. 
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that it can keep secrets from others, and then, those who share a secret amongst each other become a ‘we’. 
Secrecy has a strong effect on practices of  inclusion, exclusion and group formation. The internal role of  
secrecy is to elicit reciprocal confidence and trust, a group identity and a tight community. Pythagoreans 
even did a mock burial of  those who betrayed their secrets, and afterwards ignored these expelled initiates 
as if  they were dead. An even stronger bond arises when a secret about the ‘we’ is mutually created, as with 
accomplices in a shared crime, or a shared ritual. This bond will be the stronger if  this secret is socially 
unsupported and cannot be revealed by one of  the participants without risk for himself.54 
Understood as a tool of  group formation, secrecy is also about control and the establishment of  
hierarchies. Having a secret gives one a strong sense of  identity, and also control over others. It binds those 
with whom you share the secret to you, morally and psychologically. Furthermore, the possibility of  
disclosing the secret gives everyone power over the group as a whole. A different kind of  power arises 
when one does not only know more than the others, but one also knows that one knows more. This means 
that the others’ desire for the secret or for being part of  the group can be manipulated and exploited. 
Secrecy gives rise to strong feelings, of  freedom (you are special) but also of  frustration and oppression 
(you cannot be like the others, or you are part of  a group closely-knit around the secret). Secrecy is a way 
of  controlling the interface between what is kept hidden and what is made public, the access to 
information, and who knows what. Secrecy is often hierarchically structured: some know more than others, 
in different gradations, and these levels of  knowing are closely guarded.55  
Such practices of  secrecy are prevalent both in social networks and in formal institutions. As Max 
Weber has shown at the institutional level, secrecy plays a central role in bureaucracies. From combining 
Weber’s and Simmel’s arguments, it follows that the current bureaucracy of  scientific and governmental 
institutions can fruitfully be analysed according to the social structures of  secrecy, with different levels of  
access to and control of  information.56 Yet looser networks similarly operate by the establishment of  a 
differential access to secrets. As Lawrence Principe and William Newman have shown, when the alchemist 
George Starkey communicated his alchemical secrets to Robert Boyle and not to other alchemists, this was 
a marker of  their relationship in which trust, respect, class and patronage played an essential role.57 Secrets 
could establish even long chains of  relationships. When Henry Oldenburg sent a secret to Samuel Hartlib, 
                                                 
54 E.g. in Laurel Richardson, ‘Secrecy and Status: The Social Construction of  Forbidden Relationships’, American Sociological 
Review 1988 (53), pp. 209-219. See also the work of  Slavoj Zizek for many examples of  the complex psychodynamics of  
secrecy.  
55 See e.g. Agnes Ku, ‘Boundary Politics in the Public Sphere: Openness, Secrecy, and Leak’, Sociological Theory (1998) 16, pp. 
172-192. Hugh Urban, ‘The Torment of  Secrecy: Ethical and Epistemological Problems in the Study of  Esoteric Traditions’, 
History of  Religions (1998) 37, 209-248. 
56 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958. Lisa Blank, ‘Two schools for 
secrecy’, in Jan Goldman and Susan Maret (eds.), Government Secrecy: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Westport: Libraries 
Unlimited, 2008. 
57 William Newman and Lawrence Principe, Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of  the Helmontian Chymistry, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002. 
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for instance, he instructed the recipient to only tell it to Robert Boyle, who surely would only communicate 
it to Lady Ranalaugh, who also knew how to keep a secret. Secrecy here is a social marker that defines 
sometimes highly specific social relationships, including those that govern scientific exchanges.58  
Viewed as a social phenomenon, secrecy can have very real effects, negatively, in hampering 
circulation, in creating distrust and making social relations crumble. Yet it also has more positive 
psychological and social effects. As Tanya Luhrman has argued, sharing secrets within a closed group can 
also have therapeutic, sometimes even psychosomatic, effects - hence the attraction of  many esoteric 
communities.59 Secrecy can also accrue deeper, symbolical powers, and it can become the focus of  
ritualized practices. The mystery around secrets gives their bearers an aura of  superiority. Secrets can be 
icons and indices of  political power, used for controlling people. Secrets can even be transcendent, as 
divine secrets, at the core of  religious mysteries or of  the book of  nature, only partially revealed to the 
faithful. In the end, the meaning of  secrets is overdetermined, because they are hidden, and this allows 
diverse political, religious and other meanings and values to be projected on them.60  
Of  course, this dynamical analysis of  secrecy has to be historicised in order to better understand 
the historical specificity and conditions of  specific instances of  secrecy, with due attention to actors’ 
categories and the richness of  the practices involved. In this issue, we put forward an analysis of  secrecy 
that goes beyond its usual understanding as the rational behaviour of  an opportunist scientist or state 
interested in maintaining their intellectual property. Such an analysis allows us to place secrecy in a broader 
context of  phenomena such as dissimulation, lying, fraud, imposture, theatricality, illusionism, which do 
not necessarily involve ‘a secret’ that has to be hidden but that involve practices of  hiding and revealing.61 
Many different, sometimes flamboyant, characters enter the stage of  the history of  science, and historians 
need all the tools of  their trade to describe them. In the early modern period, scientists were characterised 
as hunters, seeking out the hidden truths of  nature.62 We could also imagine the scientist as a trickster, 
trying to outwit nature by his cunning practices. The aim of  our dynamic analysis of  secrecy, of  the play of  
veiling and revealing, is to try to capture even that fleeting and cunning character of  the trickster scientist.63 
                                                 
58 In Eamon, op. cit., p. 345. 
59 Luhrman, op. cit. 
60 Urban, op. cit. 
61 E.g. Tara Nummedal, Alchemy and Authority in the Holy Roman Empire, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007; Jon Snyder, 
Dissimulation and the Culture of  Secrecy in Early Modern Europe, Berkeley: University of  California Press, 2009; Toon van Houdt 
et al. (eds.), On the Edge of  Truth and Honesty: Principles and Strategies of  Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period, Leiden: Brill, 
2002; Rob Iliffe, ‘Lying wonders and juggling tricks: nature and imposture in early modern England’, in J. Force and D. Katz 
(eds.), Everything Connects: In Conference with Richard H. Popkin. Essays in his Honor, Leiden: Brill, 1998, pp. 183-210. 
62 Eamon, op.cit., ch. 8. For the emergence of  the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century metaphor of  the natural inquirer as 
seeking secrets contained inside the naked body of  a personified female Nature, see also Katharine Park, ‘From the secrets 
of  Women to the secrets of  nature’, in Jane Donawerth and Adele Seeff  (eds.), Crossing Boundaries. Attending to Early Modern 
Women, Newark: University of  Delaware Press, 2000, pp. 29-47. 
63 There is an interesting comparison to be made between the figure of  the trickster and the contemporary scientists, for 
instance in their use of  technology to outwit nature, in their moral ambiguity, and in their goals, working to further their own 
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interests or for the common good. For trickster, see e.g. Lewis Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth, and Art, New 
York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1998.   
